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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANN B. HOPKINS

)

)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

v.

)
)

PRICE WATERHOUSE

civil Action No. 84-3040
(Gesell, J.)

)
)

Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL BRIEF ON RELIEF ISSUES

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION ON CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
AND OTHER RELIEF ISSUES IS STILL THE LAW OF THE CASE

Thrice during the relief phase trial of this case the Court
indicated to the parties that it wanted their briefs to address
the status of the Court of Appeals' ruling on constructive
discharge, Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 472-73,
including dissent n.l.

See Tr. 10-11, 94-95, 366-367.

is the key issue at the remedy stage of this case.

Y

This

Assuming

liability, plaintiff is entitled to relief if she was
constructively discharged.

The law of the case is that she was.

Plaintiff's position is that the Court of Appeals' decision
on relief issues was unaffected by the Supreme Court's remand and
therefore remains the law of the case.

Specifically, it is the

law of the case that
Price Waterhouse's decision to deny Hopkins
partnership status, . . . coupled. with the cx:;s' s
failure to renominate her, would have been viewed. by
any reasonable senior manager in her :p::>5ition as a

_y Unless otherwise indicated, transcript references in this
brief are to the transcript of the relief phase trial held on
February 28 and March 1, 1990.

career-ending action. Accordingly, it amounted to a
constru.ctive discharge.
Id., 825 F.2d at 473.

The Court of Appeals also directed this Court

to determine the back pay plaintiff was entitled to receive for the
period between denial of partnership and plaintiff's resignation
from Price Waterhouse.

Id.

Moreover, at three different points in

its opinion, the majorit y - - with Judge Williams' concurrence -indicated that it viewed an offer of partnership as the appropriate
prospective relief and a ssumed that this Court would have ordered
that relief if it had found a constructive discharge.

Y

Procedural Background
In its "Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En
Banc" to the Court of Appeals, Price Waterhouse attacked the Court's
constructive discharge ruling.

However, after rehearing was denied,

the firm did not seek Supreme Court review of that ruling.

The

plurality opinion in the Supreme Court noted that "Price Waterhouse
does not challenge the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the refusal
to repropose [Hopkins] for partnership amounted to a constructive

y See 825 F.2d at 464: "Having concluded that Hopkins was
a victim of sexual discrimination, the trial judge went on to
find that she was nevertheless not entitled to an order directing
the firm to make her a partner."
Id. at 464-465:
"Accordingly, the [trial] court denied her
both backpay from the date of her resignation and a decree
requiring that she be invited to join Price Waterhouse as a
partner."
Id. at 472 "With respect to post[r]esignation damages, the
District Court found that Hopkins had failed to demonstrate that
she had been constructively discharged and therefore was
ineligible both for backpay subsequent to the date of her
resignation and an order directing that she be made a partner."
(Underscoring added.)
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discharge."
(1989).

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 s.ct. 1275, 1281 n.l

And in its concluding paragraph and judgment, the plurality

reversed "the Court of Appeals' judgment against Price Waterhouse on
liability" and remanded the case to that Court for further
proceedings.

Id. at 1795 (underscoring added).

This was the

judgment in which Justices White and O'Connor concurred.

Id. at

1795, 1796.
The mandate of the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that Court "for further
proceedings in conformity with the opinion of this Court."

The

Court of Appeals then vacated its own 1987 mandate, vacated this
Court's judgment, and remanded the case to this Court for further
proceedings.

Y

Discussion
The Supreme Court took pains not to decide, disapprove or even
discuss the Court of Appeals' ruling on constructive discharge.
Contrast Johnson v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 457
U.S. 52 (1982), where the Court vacated a Seventh Circuit judgment
altogether in order to insure that "the doctrine of the law of the
case does not constrain either the District Court, or should an
appeal subsequently be taken, the Court of Appeals."
55.

Id. at 54-

since the mandate of the Supreme Court "is controlling only as

to matters within its compass on the remand, a lower court is free
as to other issues."

Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 n.18

y We recognize that we earlier mistakenly said the Court of
Appeals had vacated its 1987 opinion (Plaintiff's Pretrial Brief
on Remedy at 5). That is not so; only the mandate was vacated.
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(1979); Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168
(1939).

While the Court of Appeals vacated its own mandate, its

opinion on constructive discharge remains the law of the case and
therefore must be respected by this Court.
"[T]he law of the case . . . when used to express the duty of a
lower court to follow what has been decided by a higher court at an
earlier stage of the case applies to everything decided, either
expressly or by necessary implication."

City of Cleveland, Ohio v.

Federal Power Commission, 561 F.2d 344, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
quoting Munro v. Post, 102 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1939).

While the

doctrine does not apply to findings that are "integral" to a vacated
judgment of the higher court, Dorsey v. Continental Cas. Co., 730
F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1984), it otherwise "invokes the rule that
findings of fact and conclusions of law by an appellate court are
generally binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in
the trial court or in a later appeal."

Id.

In this case the Supreme Court disapproved some of the findings
and conclusions of the Court of Appeals on liability and reversed
the appellate court's judgment on liability.

But it carefully left

undisturbed the Court of Appeals' findings and conclusions on
relief.

These findings and conclusions were vacated by neither the

Supreme court nor the Court of Appeals and remain the law of the
case if judgment is again entered for plaintiff.
Moreover, there are strong reasons to foresee that the Court of
Appeals would adhere to its prior decision on relief and none to
foresee a different result should this case again be appealed to
that Court.

We now discuss those reasons.
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1.

There Are No New Facts Relating to the Constructive

Discharge Issue.

There has been no new evidence on the constructive

discharge issue.

Therefore, one of the few accepted reasons to

reconsider a decision that would otherwise be the law of the case,
namely, that "the evidence in a subsequent trial was substantially
different,"

Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 195 (D.C.Cir.),

quoting White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431-432 (5th Cir. 1967), is
inapplicable here.
2.

The Court of Appeals Declined Rehearing on This Issue and

There Is No Intervening Controlling Authority to the Contrary.

A

future application to the Court of Appeals to reconsider the
constructive discharge would be no more than an out-of-time request
for a second rehearing, with no intervening change in the law to
justify such an action.

Our Court of Appeals has strongly

disapproved the use of subsequent appeals to reargue its earlier
rulings:
Moreover, we take this opportunity to emphasize that
this court will not, absent truly "exceptional
ci.rct.nnstances," I.affey II, 642 F.2d at 585, look
favorably on arguments against the law of the case
which fall only under the "manifest injustice"
rubric. We do not intend to allow this avenue of
attack on the law of the case to become an auxiliary
vehicle for the repetition of arguments previously
advanced, without success, in appellate briefs,
petitions for rehearing, arxi petitions for certiorari.
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (Laffey III), 740 F.2d 1071,
1082-1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984)

(footnote omitted).

Compare Johnson

v. Bechtel Associates Professional Corp., 801 F.2d 412, 416
(D.C.Cir. 1986), disapproving invocation of the Court's inherent
power to recall its mandate at any time, for good cause, as a
means to grant a "late rehearing."
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Indeed, the Court of Appeals' adherence to the law of the
case in subsequent appeals has been so strong that it has even
refused to disturb earlier rulings which it recognized were
erroneous.

See Webster v. Sun Co. Inc., 790 F.2d 157, 161

(D.C.Cir. 1986); and Laffey v. Northwest Airlines Inc. (Laffey
II), 642 F.2d 578, where the Court recognized that its earlier
interpretation of the Equal Pay Act in Laffey I, 567 F.2d 429
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978), was in
error.

Nonetheless, in Laffey II the Court declined to

reconsider that interpretation:
appellate court also is nonnally bound by the law
of the case it established on a prior appeal, and for
a very sound reason. If justice is to be served,
there must at some point be an end to litigation; on
that account, the power to recall mandates should be
exercised sparingly. To warrant divergence from the
law of the case, a court must not only be convinced
that its earlier decision was erroneous, it must also
be satisfied that adherence to the law of the case
will work a grave injustice. In the litigation before
us, we perceive no exceptional circumstances which
would justify overriding the stron::r policy of repose
nonnally accorded past decisions. OUr prior
inter:pretation of the F.qual Pay Act admittedly was
overinclusive - a defect that for posterity we later
cure in this opinion -- but that is as much as can be
said. If error without more sufficed to render a
decision forever vulnerable to reopening, the law of
the case doctrine would lose all meaning. Here, as in
another context the First Circuit once said, "we
believe it would be far greater error to pennit
reconsideration naw after denial of petitions for
rehearing and certiorari. '!here must be an end to
dispute."

An

Laffey II, 642 F.2d at 585 (footnotes omitted).
3.

The Constructive Discharge Decision Was In Line With

Prior Case Law In This Circuit.

It is a reasonable inference

that the Court of Appeals declined to rehear en bane the panel's
unanimous constructive discharge decision in this case because
-6-

that decision was in line with its prior decision in Clark v.
Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C.Cir. 1981).

The Court of Appeals in

this case merely applied the principles of Clark v. Marsh to a
specialized situation, i.e., the all-but-final rejection for
partner of a "partner track" employee in a professional firm
where the customary practice in such situations was for the
employee t o leave, the classic "up or out."

The career path here

was relatively unique, although in reality hardly different from
the practice of enforced departure presented in Hishon v. King
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).

&

Moreover, apart from the fact that

departure after rejection is inherent in this professional
setting, plaintiff had also made known from the outset that her
eligibility to become a partner was an "absolute prerequisite"
for her joining Price Waterhouse.

Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse,

825 F.2d at 472.
Defendant's practice means that a decision not to propose or
consider a professional employee for partner is likely to be
career-ending in two senses.

First, almost by definition there

are no prospects for becoming a partner.

Second, if the employee

ignores the custom and stays on, a likely result is that firm
members will resent this break with past practice and the
employee's work situation will actually deteriorate.
There is no reason to think that appellate reexamination of
the constructive discharge decision in this case would occur or,
if it did, would lead to a different result.

Hence it must be

accepted as fact that plaintiff's departure from Price Waterhouse
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was a constructive discharge, and that plaintiff is therefore
entitled to relief.

II.

PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ADMITTED TO PARTNERSHIP

ii

Assuming liability, plaintiff is due full relief.

Albemarle

Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Lander v. Lujan, 888
F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
The most serious discretionary issue on relief is whether
plaintiff should be admitted to partnership.
should be.

We believe that she

First, lesser relief would not only be incomplete; it

would also be doomed to fail.

Thus, although defendant has

suggested that it would be sufficient to give plaintiff a new,
fair opportunity for consideration, Mr. Connor's testimony made
it clear that the die would be cast against her, as the Court
noted at trial [Tr. 329-30).

Second, defendant has simply not

shown how plaintiff's entry into a large firm, in which her
particular specialty is booming, would cause any specific
problems or disruption.

Certainly some partners would be

initially unhappy, but a "discrimination remedy cannot turn on
the employer's preferences."
158.

Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d at

And there is nothing in the record to suggest that any

partners could not work professionally with plaintiff, or she
with them.
Admission to partnership should be the presumptive remedy in
this case.

See, e.g., Cassino v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 817

ii Many of the issues herein are addressed in more detail in
plaintiff's pretrial briefs.
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F.2d 1338, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 s.ct. 785
(1988)

(observing that "reinstatement is the preferred remedy" in

ADEA cases).

Defendant has not shown why plaintiff's admission

as a partner would be inappropriate.

She should be admitted.

Plaintiff is also entitled to back pay.

Dr. Tryon's

computation is reasonable, especially as it is grounded largely
on stipulated facts [Pl.Ex. Al4-Al5].

We agree that plaintiff

had a duty to mitigate after she left Price Waterhouse.
so.

She did

The burden is on defendant to prove inadequate mitigation,

see Floca v. Homcare Health Services, 845 F.2d 108, 111 (5th Cir.
1988), and defendant has not done so here.
5.

See Proposed Finding

As a legal matter, it is reasonable for someone to mitigate

by setting up her own business, Carden v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 850 F.2d 996, 1005 (3d Cir. 1988), and as a practical
matter this was a recognized avenue for former Price Waterhouse
employees.

See Proposed Finding 5(b).

Moreover, defendant has

not shown that plaintiff could have become a partner in another
Big 8 firm, and no other type of firm was identified having
compensation even approaching that possible at Price
Waterhouse.

See Proposed Finding 5(c).

In fact, it is highly unlikely that plaintiff could have
become a partner elsewhere.

Price Waterhouse itself has never

admitted as a partner someone who had been turned down by another
Big 8 firm, and of the more than 100 candidates rejected by
defendant for partnership from 1980 to 1987, only 4 later became
partners at other Big 8 firms.

For plaintiff, who had filed a

suit against Price Waterhouse that received some publicity, the
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odds would have been still longer.

See Brewster v. Martin

Marietta, 47 FEP 1276, 1282 (Mich. 1985) (one of factors making it
unlikely for plaintiff to secure comparable employment was that
it was "probably well known that she had filed a sex
discrimination suit against her former employers").
Finding 5(d).

See Proposed

Ultimately, of course, plaintiff got a job at the

World Bank paying more than $90,000 annually.

This is an

excellent position by any standard, and defendant has not shown
that she could have done better.
Although there was much testimony on front pay, such
compensation becomes an issue only if the Court declines to order
defendant to invite plaintiff to become a partner.

In that

event, full relief requires that she be given monetary relief in
lieu of partnership.

See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742

F.2d 724, 727-29 (2d Cir. 1984).

Dr. Tryon's testimony on front

pay was not seriously challenged.

See Proposed Finding 6.

There

are uncertainties, of course, but these are inevitable any time
future losses are projected.
basis for withholding relief.

They certainly do not provide a
Jones

Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 546 (1983).

&

Laughlin Steel Corp. v.

See also Bigelow v. RKO Radio

Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946) ("[t]he most elementary
conceptions of justice and public policy require that the
wrongdoer shall bear the risk of uncertainty which his own wrong
has created").
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.

.

III.

PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED DECREE IS REASONABLE
AND IS NOT INTRUSIVE

The proposed decree is short and straightforward.

The first

five paragraphs provide that plaintiff is to be extended an offer
of partnership effective July 1, 1990

the next regularly

scheduled admission date for partners

that back pay as

computed by Dr. Tryon will be awarded, that plaintiff will be
treated for all purposes as if she had been admitted on July 1,
1983, and that she will not be subjected to retaliation.
Initially plaintiff will receive the average compensation given
consulting partners in her class; thereafter her shares will be
adjusted on the same basis as is done for other partners.
Paragraphs 6-9 address the issue of preventing sexual
stereotyping from affecting the partnership admissions process.
These provisions are designed to be minimally intrusive, to be
largely self-policing and to build on what Price Waterhouse says
it has already been doing since this Court's first decision in
1985.

These provisions are being submitted in accordance with

the Court's instructions at the close of the recent trial [Tr.
365-66].
Paragraph 6 is a general injunction.

Paragraph 7 requires

defendant to adopt a written policy barring sex discrimination in
the admissions process and, in particular, cautioning against
stereotyping.

Mr. Connor's testimony suggests that Price

Waterhouse may already have taken some steps in this regard [Tr.
254-55].

Paragraph 7 also requires, however, that defendant's

policy provide that partners who act on stereotypes (or otherwise
discriminate) may suffer reduction of future share allocations.
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This is in line with Susan Fiske's testimony that incentives are
needed to prevent stereotyping (Original Trial, March 28, 1985,
transcript at 620-21].
Paragraph 8 requires the Policy Board to screen all comments
made about women candidates, to look into those that may be
reflective of stereotyping, and to discard such comments (as well
as all negative remarks made by the same p artner) unless it is
clear that the comments were not the product of stereotyping.
Again, it appears from Mr. Connor's testimony that Price
Waterhouse has always undertaken a screening process along the
lines proposed [Tr. 255].
Paragraphs 7 and 8 are intended to work in tandem -- the
former to discourage stereotyping in the first instance, the
latter to weed out any stereotyping that still manages to creep
into the process.

These provisions are self-policing and simply

build on defendant's own initiatives.

The one new feature is to

add the possibility of discipline for partners who act on
stereotypes or otherwise discriminate.

This possibility alone

may be sufficient to prevent stereotyping from affecting the
admissions process.
Paragraph 9 requires defendant to maintain records relating
to partnership admissions for five years.

We are not proposing

that any reports be filed with the Court, but we believe the
records should be available for annual inspection by counsel for
plaintiff.
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.•
Paragraph 10 relates to attorneys' fees and requires the
parties to follow Local Rule 215.

As noted in an earlier

pleading, the parties hope it will be possible to resolve all fee
issues without resort to the Court.

In any event, Paragraph 10

requires the parties to report on the status of fee discussions
within 30 days of the date of the decree.

CONCLUSION
The proposed decree gives plaintiff full relief but does not
hamstring defendant.

We ask that it be entered.

Respectfully submitted,

J~50

89326
KATOR, SCOTT & HELLER
1275 K Street, N.W.
Suite 950
Washington, D.C.
20005
(202) 898-4800
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Certificate of Service
On March 30 , 1990 plaintiff's proposed findings of fact on
relief, proposed decree and supporting brief were delivered to:
Theodore B. Olson
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036

